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United States v. Ursery: The Long Arm of
the Law Gets Reattached
In United States v. Ursery,1 the United States Supreme Court
evaluated the constitutionality of in rem civil forfeitures when they are
used with criminal proceedings in relation to a single act. Ursery was
a consolidation of two cases, United States v. Ursery2 and United States
v. $405,089.23 United States Currency,' from the Sixth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals, respectively.
I.

FACTS

In Ursery, the Michigan State Police found an illegal narcotics-growing
operation adjacent to the home of the respondent, Guy Ursery.4 The
United States instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7)5 against Ursery's home in federal district court.6 The
government contended that the home had been used for several years to
traffic narcotics. Ursery agreed to pay the United States $13,250 to
settle the forfeiture claim.' Before the claim was paid, however, Ursery
was indicted and convicted on narcotics manufacturing violations.'
Ursery appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds
that his conviction violated his constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1" The Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against three abuses: "a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense."" Ursery

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994) (allowing asset forfeiture for narcotics violations).
116 S. Ct. at 2139.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
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contended that the conviction constituted a second punishment for
purposes of double jeopardy. 2 The court of appeals, in a divided vote,
agreed and reversed Ursery's criminal conviction."3
In $405,089.23 United States Currency,the government filed an in rem
proceeding in district court against currency the government believed
had been gained through the laundering of drug profits. 4 Wesley Arlt
and James Wren possessed the currency when it was seized by the
government." Arlt and Wren were convicted on drug distribution and
money laundering charges after the in rem suit was filed, but before it
was litigated. 6 The district court cited 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) 17 and
granted summary judgment for the government in the in rem proceeding
after the criminal conviction.'" The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision
on the grounds that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."9
The Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in
reaching their decisions in Ursery and $405,089.23 United States
Currency.2' The circuits relied on the holdings of United States v.
Halper2' and Austin v. United States,22 two recent Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the issue of double jeopardy and civil forfeitures.
The appellate courts in Ursery and 405,089.23 United States Currency
interpreted Halper and Austin as categorically making civil forfeitures
punishment and thus, unconstitutional when used in conjunction with
criminal prosecutions.23 The Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for certiorari in Ursery and $405,089.23 United States Currency
and reversed the appellate courts. 24 The Supreme Court stated,
"[tihese civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we hold, do not
constitute 'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."

12. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16.

Id.

17. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994) (allowing asset forfeiture for violations of money
laundering laws).
18. 116 S.Ct. at 2139.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
22. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
23. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2138.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Civil forfeiture in the United States historically has been one of the
most potent weapons available to prosecutors. 26 Civil forfeiture,
however, originally began in English common law. 27 English common

law recognized three types of civil forfeiture. 2 The first type of
forfeiture was called deodand forfeiture. 2' Deodand forfeiture required
any object that caused the death of a king's subject to be forfeited to the
crown.'
Deodand forfeitures were often justified as a penalty for
carelessness. 3 The second type of civil forfeiture in English common
law was property seizure of individuals convicted of a felony or of
treason. 2 The justification for this forfeiture was that a criminal act
equaled a breach of the king's peace and the perpetrator should be
denied property ownership. 3 The third type of forfeiture employed in
English common law was created by statutes and generally used to seize
objects that were in violation of customs and revenue laws.
These
statutory forfeitures used the in rem fiction to seize the property.8
Deodand forfeitures did not become part of common.law in the United
States.36 For the most part, forfeiture for felony convictions did not
either.3 7 However, in the United States, if convicted, treason still
carries the penalty of property forfeiture for life.' Statutory forfeitures
have been extensively adopted in the United States.39 The earliest

26. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993). Civil forfeitures are
distinctly different from criminal forfeitures that take place in the same trial as the actual
criminal prosecution. These criminal forfeitures are not subject to the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but are generally disfavored by prosecutors because they add complex issues in
property law to an already complicated criminal trial. Interview with James Fleissner,
Mercer Law School Professor and former United States Attorney, in Macon, Ga. (Oct. 9,
1996).
27. Jimmy Gurule, Introduction: The Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J.
LEGIS. 155, 156 (1995).
28. Id. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83
(1974).
29. Id. at 680-81.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 419, 423-24 (1st Am. ed. 1847)).
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299).
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 682.
37. Id. at 682-83.

38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
39,

416 U.S. at 683 (quoting C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)),
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forfeiture laws in the United States came shortly after the ratification
of the Constitution in 1789.' These acts dealt primarily with forfeiture
of ships and cargo that were in violation of customs laws.41 The federal
government, in time, did not limit these forfeiture statutes to customs
violations. Today, "forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of
property that might be used in the conduct of criminal enterprise."4 2
Many Supreme Court cases have reinforced the legality of civil
forfeitures. In one of the earliest cases, an 1827 decision, The Palmyra,' the Supreme Court held in rem forfeitures constitutional even
if the defendant was prosecuted on criminal charges for the same act."
In the opinion, Justice Story stated, "the practice has been, and so this
Court understand[s] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands
independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam."" Justice Story reinforced the theory that in rem proceedings are directed against a thing, and therefore no punishment is
directed toward an individual.46 In 1877, the Supreme Court again had
an opportunity to rule on civil forfeitures in Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States.47 In Dobbins's Distillery, the Court found constitutional
the forfeiture of a building used to illegally produce alcohol, even though
the owner had no knowledge of the activity.4

Early in this century,

the Supreme Court revisited the issue of in rem civil forfeitures in
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States.49 The Court
upheld a revenue statute that provided for civil forfeiture and stated
that during in rem proceedings, "[tihe provision of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply."'
Many other Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed this general principle.5 '
In 1970, Congress began to expand the use of forfeitures with the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 2 This statute
provides for the forfeiture of the illegal narcotic, production and

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 14-15.
47. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
48. Id. at 395-401.
49. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).

50. Id. at 581.
51. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); see also Origet v. United States, 125
U.S. 240 (1888).
52. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West Supp. 1996); Gurule, supra note 27, at 157-58.
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distribution equipment, and any records involved.5 3 Congress again
expanded the forfeiture laws in 1984 by enacting the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act ("CFA7). 4 The CFA provided the first congressional
authorization for the forfeiture of real property used in narcotics
violations. 5 Most drug related forfeitures are pursued under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(4),(6), and (7).56 Finally, Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 which authorized civil forfeiture of any
property involved in money laundering schemes.57
The Supreme Court did not stand by idly as Congress expanded the
forfeiture laws."8 In 1972 and 1984, the Court reaffirmed that civil
forfeitures did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause in One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States 9 and United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms.' In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the
Court stated, "the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials
nor two criminal punishments." 6' The Court went on to say, however,
that in some instances a forfeiture could be criminal if it was not
remedial in nature. 2 Similarly, in One Assortment of 89 Firearms,the
Court ruled that a forfeiture proceeding was not a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause even if accompanied by a criminal trial, but
added, "[tihe question, then, is whether a ... forfeiture proceeding is
intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or
civil and remedial."6 The Court laid out a two-step process to determine if a forfeiture was civil or criminal." The first step determines
whether Congress intended the law to be criminal or civil.65 The
second step looks at the forfeiture itself to see, regardless of congressional intent, whether the statute was so punitive as to reach the level of

53.

21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a); Gurule, supra note 27, at 158 n.2.

54. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(aX4)-(7)
(1994)); Gurule, supra note 27, at 158-59.
55. Gurule, supra note 27, at 158-59.
56. Id. at 159.
57. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-35 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994)); Gurule,
supra note 27, at 159.
58. Gurule, supra note 27, at 161.
59. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
60. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
61. 409 U.S. at 235.
62. Id. at 237.
63. 465 U.S. at 362-63.
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
65. Id.
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punishment." If the forfeiture passes these two levels of analysis, it
is civil in nature and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply.6 7
In 1989, the Court did rule a civil forfeiture proceeding as punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v. Halper.6 The
Court found the statutory forfeiture scheme to be not remedial or
compensatory, but punitive. 9 Although the forfeiture was labeled
nonpunitive, it functioned as punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy.70 It was punishment because the civil liability was measured
at $130,000, even though actual government expense was no more than
$16,000. 7 1 Moreover, because the civil liabilities were calculated at a
set fine of $2000 per offense, this was a fine structure that was more
punitive than remedial in nature.72 Three years later in Austin, the
Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 73 applied to civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and
(7).74 Although not dealing directly with the Fifth Amendment, the
Austin decision raised the question of whether all civil forfeitures should
be considered punishment under the same analysis. 7 As a result of
Halper, Austin, and Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,7" many
different views emerged from the various courts of appeals,7 7 and it was
not until United States v. Ursery75 on June 24, 1996 that the diversity
was resolved.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In Ursery, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four other justices,79
wrote the opinion of the Court holding that civil forfeitures are not a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause if they are nonpunitive and
8
remedial in nature.8 0 Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, 1

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Id. at 452.
Id.

71.

Id.

72. Id. at 438.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
74. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
75. Gurule, supra note 27, at 163.
76. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (holding that a tax on
marijuana possession that was imposed after a criminal conviction was double jeopardy).
77. Gurule, supra note 27, at 163.
78. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
79. The Justices that joined the majority were O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., Souter, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.
80. 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
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and Justices Scalia and Thomas filed an opinion concurring in judgment. 2 Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.
The Court reversed the rulings of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals because of a long line of precedent in favor of civil forfeitures.~"
The Court began with an extensive analysis of the history of in rem civil
forfeitures in the United States." After examining a host of previous
cases, the Court concluded that statutory forfeiture has long been
deemed constitutional and not double jeopardy." The argument for
civil forfeiturewas even stronger, the Court stated, when an in rem
proceeding was involved.8 7 This is because the legal fiction of in rem
allows one to proceed against the property, rather than the person. 8
Thus, no punishment exists against any individual.8 9
After completing the examination of precedent in favor of civil
forfeitures, the Court attempted to distinguish its recent decisions in
Austin and Halper on which the Ninth and Sixth Circuits had relied in
deciding Ursery."° Halper was distinguishable because the statutory
scheme involved was not remedial, but punitive.9 ' The fines in Halper
were predetermined fines of $2000 per violation. 92 This, along with the
fine of $130,000, a sum that was 220 times greater than the expenses
the government had incurred, made this particular fine a punishment
from a double jeopardy analysis.93 In Ursery, however, there was no
similar fine structure. Moreover, "[tihe narrow focus of Halperfollowed
from the distinction that we have drawn historically between civil
forfeitures and civil penalties.'
The Court then distinguished Austin from Ursery.95 The Sixth and
Ninth Circuits had used Austin in ruling the forfeitures in Ursery
To distinguish Ursery from Austin, the Court
unconstitutional."

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2152 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment).
2152 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2149.
2140-42.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 2140.
88. Id. (citing the decision in Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282
U.S. 577 (1931)).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 2143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2144.
Id. at 214647.
Id. at 2142-43.
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simply stated, "Austin was decided solely under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, a constitutional provision which we
never have understood as parallel to, or even related to, the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7 The Court went on to say
that the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals misread the Halper
and Austin decisions.98
After explaining how the appeals courts erroneously interpreted the
Halper and Austin decisions, the Court applied the two-step analysis
used in One Assortment of 89 Firearms to determine when forfeitures
become punishment. 9 The first step of the test is for a court to decide
whether or not Congress intended the forfeiture statute to be a
punishment."° The forfeiture provisions used in the Ursery cases were
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).' The Court found
that Congress intended these statutes as remedial civil actions for
several reasons.10 2 First, Congress attempted to make them impersonal by using the in rem fiction to target the property and not the
individual.0 3 Next, Congress did not require actual notice of impending forfeitures, making the property the important party, not the
owner." 4 Finally, by making the level of proof only probable cause,
0
Congress intended this action as a distinctly separate civil remedy."
The Court then moved to the second stage of the analysis to find if the
forfeitures were in fact punitive in nature, regardless of congressional
intent.' 6 Again, the Court found the statutes to be constitutional
because they serve important nonpunitive goals.0 7 These nonpunitive
goals include encouraging owners to take care in managing their
property, ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes,
preventing further illegal use of the property, and preventing the
circulation of illegally obtained property," s The Court also noted that
to find statutes punitive which Congress had intended to be remedial
requires the clearest proof of such punishment, as stated in One
Assortment of 89 Firearms. 9 The Court concluded its opinion by
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2146.
Id. at 2144.
Id. at 2147-49.
Id.
Id. at 2139.
Id. at 2147-49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2147-48.
Id. at 2148.
Id. at 2148-49.
Id.
Id. at 2148.
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holding that although the statutes at hand can serve as some deterrence,
in these cases they "are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.""'
Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority, but elaborated on the
theory of in ren proceedings being against the property and therefore,
not punishment against any individual."' Justice Kennedy further
added that although this decision did not clarify the two-step analysis
used previously in One Assortment of 89 Firearms,given the weight of
precedent, concurrence was justified." 2 Justice Scalia wrote a short
concurrence which was joined by Justice Thomas, stating: "In my view,
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not
successive punishment.""'
Justice Stevens concurred with the decision against the $405,089.23
United States Currency from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but
dissented in regard to the forfeiture action against Ursery's home from
the Sixth Circuit. 1 4 Justice Stevens first argued that even if the
majority's reasoning concerning civil forfeiture statutes was correct, as
applied to these facts, the forfeiture was punitive." 5 Justice Stevens
explained in Ursery that the respondent's home was confiscated even
though "[tihere is no evidence that the house had been purchased with
the proceeds of unlawful activity and the house itself was surely not
contraband."" 6 Given these circumstances, Justice Stevens felt the
Ursery forfeiture was not supported by any reasons laid out by the
majority and should therefore be considered punishment." 7 Justice
Stevens then began a lengthy attack on the theoretical underpinnings
of the in rem legal fiction by calling it a "fanciful premise.""' The
fiction was fanciful to Justice Stevens because even during in rem
proceedings the owner of the property is ultimately being punished."'
Justice Stevens further argued that One Assortment of 89 Firearmsand
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones should be read in support of his dissent
because they pointed out that in rem proceedings, as a categorical
matter, were never exempted from double jeopardy constraints. 20

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 2149.
Id. at 2150-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2151-52.
Id. at 2152 (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., concurring in judgment)..
Id. at 2152-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 2152.
Id. at 2152-53.
Id. at 2153-54.
Id. at 2158-60.
Id. at 2155-56.
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Justice Stevens concluded by stating that regardless of whether the
action was in rem, there was "simply no rational basis for characterizing
home as anything other than punishthe seizure of this respondent's
121
crime."
his
for
ment
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in Ursery was critical in clarifying an
issue that had been interpreted differently in the various judicial
circuits."2 Prior to the Ursery decision, a respondent may or may not
have had their property seized simply by the fortuity of which judicial
circuit had jurisdiction. For instance, in the Second and Eleventh
Circuits, the Double Jeopardy Clause would likely have not been a
defense." These circuits viewed in rem proceedings as two parts to a
single prosecution; therefore, no double jeopardy issues arose.124
Conversely, in the Ninth Circuit, a defendant did not have to be
concerned about having property forfeited after a criminal prosecution
because the court considered civil forfeitures, as a categorical matter,
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 Lastly, in the Fifth Circuit,
defendants ran the risk of having their property forfeited, but only if it
could be characterized as "drug proceeds." 126 These divergent views
resulted in an application of the Double Jeopardy Clause that was not
uniform.
The Supreme Court in Ursery attempted to remedy this problem with
the reaffirmation of the two-step analysis.'2 7 This analysis should be
applied to all forfeiture statutes whether they are labelled remedial,
The first stage of the test is to determine if
punitive, or civil."
Congress intended the statute to be remedial or punitive.'2 If Congress intended the statute to be punitive, then double jeopardy applies.
If Congress has not intended the statute to be punitive, then the second
step of the test is applied. 3 ' In the second step, the court must
determine if the statute is punitive regardless of congressional intent. 1 1 If the statute is found to be punitive, then double jeopardy

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2161.
Gurule, supra note 27, at 162-64.
Id. at 163-64.
Id.
Id. at 165-67.
Id. at 164-65. See United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994).
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
I& at 2143.
Id. at 2142.
Id.
Id.
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applies.'
However, if Congress did not intend the statute to be
punitive, there must be the clearest proof that the forfeiture has risen
The test reaffirmed in Ursery will now
to the level of punishment.'
take the place of the differing standards the courts of appeals have been
applying in similar situations. The Ursery decision also reinforces the
precedent that civil forfeitures, if correctly applied, do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 4
After the decisions in Austin, Halper, and Kurth Ranch, many
commentators predicted an end to all civil actions that took place in
conjunction with criminal prosecutions on double jeopardy grounds.13
Given the reasoning in those decisions this conclusion was logical. Thus,
the decision in Ursery was an unexpected shift back to supporting civil
forfeitures.
Another important result of the decision in Ursery is the return to
prosecutors of one of their most potent weapons in the war on drugs.""
The level of proof for asset seizure is only probable cause. Therefore,
federal prosecutors often use forfeitures when criminal prosecutions fail
or when evidence to charge is lacking. 37 These civil forfeitures were
often used as the long arm of the law when criminal prosecution
attempts failed to reach or were ineffective in reaching the assets. The
decision in Ursery will also avoid the scenario where a criminal goes
unprosecuted because he has already settled a civil forfeiture claim in
the same matter. By giving prosecutors and Congress guidelines to
follow in establishing and using civil forfeitures, the Court in Ursery has
reestablished forfeitures as a viable option to combat crime in all
circuits.
BRIAN C. MAX

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2149.
135. See Andrew L. Subin, The Double Jeopardy Implications of In Rem Forfeitureof
Crime-RelatedProperty: The GradualRealizationof a ConstitutionalViolation, 19 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 253 (1996); Gurule, supra note 27, at 173; Jeffrey M. Geller, The Impact of
Recent Double Jeopardy Decisions on FederalAgencies, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 327 (1996).
136. See Gurule, supra note 27, at 156.
137. Gary M. Maveal, CriminalizingCivil Forfeitures,74 MICH. B.J. 658 (1995).

